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Summary 
Qinzhou Port is one of the most important ports in the “Beibu Gulf” of China. It is also 
the main hub port of the "21st century maritime silk road" strategy. Based on a basic collision 
risk assessment approach, an Event Sequence Diagram (ESD) model that explains the four-
stage collision avoidance decision-making procedure is proposed from the perspectives of 
perception, cognition, decision, and execution. Using the historical data derived from 
collision accident reports from the Qinzhou Port waters from 2013 to 2017, as well as the data 
elicited from expert knowledge, a quantitative evaluation of probability distributions of 
different collision failure modes is performed. The results are also compared with relevant 
results from other types of navigation waters to analyse collision risk level of Qinzhou waters. 
At the same time, the main failures paths of collision avoidance decision making are 
identified. The proposed model can provide with an overall collision risk picture from a 
macro perspective. 
Key words: Qinzhou Port; ship collision; Event Sequence Diagram; collision avoidance 
failure mode 
1. Introduction 
Qinzhou Port is one of the most important ports in the “Beibu Gulf” area of China. It 
has many advantages in terms of geographical position advantage, favourable port conditions 
with wide water area, low frequency of storms, small amount of incoming sand, stable 
shoreline, and favourable conditions for constructing deep-water berths[1]. In May 2008, the 
Chinese national government approved the establishment of China's 6th world-connected port 
in Qinzhou Port. In 2018, the annual cargo handling capacity of Qinzhou Port reached more 
than 100 million tons. Under the guidance of Chinese "21st century Maritime Silk Road" 
Strategy (MSR Strategy), Qinzhou Port is also striving for opportunities in the worldwide 
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supply chain network [2] and actively integrating itself into the development of MSR 
Strategy. 
With the continuous growing ship traffic volume, it is important to keep ship collision 
risk at acceptable level at Qinzhou Port from risk management and emergency decision 
making perspectives. Fig. 1 presents a distribution of maritime accident in Qinzhou Port from 
2013 to 2017. As can be seen from Fig. 1, collisions/contacts accounts for a large proportion 
among all types of accidents, and a growing trend is observed during the past years. The 
vessel traffic flow in Qinzhou Port in the corresponding years is present in Table 1. In view of 
this, the main objective of this paper is to perform a quantitative analysis on the failure 
probabilities of collision avoidance decision to present a full picture of collision risk in the 
water area, and to identify the main causations of collision accidents. Furthermore, 
measurements of managing and reducing the risk can be formulated by focusing on the most 
influencing factors. In other words, the study will support the administrators and shipping 
companies in putting forward effective risk management measures to reduce accident rate. 
 
Fig. 1  Distribution of maritime accident in Qinzhou Port  
Table 1  Ship traffic volume in the Qinzhou Port 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
Traffic Volume 21395 14235 11972 27452 29668 104722 
The failure modes of collision accidents in Qinzhou Port will be investigated in detail 
using an Event Sequence Diagram (ESD) model. Different failure modes are quantified using 
historical data as well as knowledge from experts. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: Literature review in maritime risk assessment and collision risk modelling is 
discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, the ESD model is constructed, along with the predictions 
on failure probabilities. Results and analyses are presented in Section 4, followed by 
discussions in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are made in Section 6. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Maritime risk definition 
Maritime safety and risk assessment methods have been attracting growing interest for 
many years. It is a fundamental issue to make a definition on maritime risk. In general, 
maritime risk is defined as the probabilities of undesired event multiplied by the possible 
consequences in terms of fatalities, economic loss, and environment pollution [3]. However, 
such concept may not reflect the full picture for very frequent accidents but with small 
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consequence, as well as very rare accidents with catastrophic consequences. For example, the 
risk values for these two types of accidents maybe quite similar, but they have quite different 
characteristics and should be investigated in different perspectives. In order to overcome this, 
a scenario-based maritime risk concept was proposed [4], in which the probabilities and 
consequences are correlated with specific scenarios. Furthermore, some recent researches [5] 
[6] applied indicator sets, in which contributions of indicator sets to accidents can be 
quantified. This leads to proposing the most effective measurements in dealing with maritime 
risks. Goerlandt & Montewka[7] and Lim et al.[8] performed comprehensive literature review 
on maritime transportation risk assessment from the perspectives of foundation issues and 
computational algorithms, respectively. They concluded that it is very important to address 
the issues of uncertainties in dealing with different types of data, including subjective, 
historical, qualitative and quantitative.  
The concepts above tried to express risks from a perspective of undesired events. 
Comparatively, Resilience Engineering (RE) theory [9] tries to investigate it from the safety 
perspective. That is to say, it mainly focusses on “what can go right?” instead of “what can go 
wrong”. One reason for doing this is the fact that undesired events are usually rare, and it is 
not easy to get enough data to perform in-depth analysis. In general, most of RE models in 
maritime risk assessment are largely at the conceptual phase and few of them are capable to 
achieve quantitative evaluation on the risks. 
2.2 Collision risk models 
A lot of researches have been performed in both maritime and collision risk assessment. 
Li et al. [10] performed a comprehensive literature review on maritime risk assessment from 
both frequency and consequence estimation models. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
models were discussed. They concluded that quantifying the human errors in maritime 
accidents is the most challenging issue in the future research. In dealing with human factors 
quantification, Martins & Maturana [11] proposed a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
approach for the human failure evaluation in the collisions and groundings accident of oil 
tankers, in which the greatest potentials to reduce the risk are identified. Banda et al.[12] did 
similar research on the risk management modelling in extreme navigation environment like 
arctic waters. Collisions between ships are one of the most frequently occurring types of 
accidents in maritime traffic. Collision risk assessment has been a hot topic for a long time. 
One of the most widely applied collision risk assessment methods was the Fujii and Macduff 
model [13][14], which is expressed using the following formula: 
                     A C
P N P=
 (1) 
Where NA is the number of encounters which occur in a specific water area within a 
certain period of time. If no effective action was taken, collision will occur. This parameter is 
usually referred to encounter rate. The number of encounters are usually very frequent in 
some traffic intensive waters [15]–[17]. PC is the probability of failure of collision avoidance 
actions when two ships are approaching each other. This paper focuses on the quantitative 
analysis of ship collision avoidance action failure probability (PC) in Qinzhou Port.  
2.2.1 Encounter rate prediction 
The encounter rate between ships within a certain waterway is usually predicted from 
the perspective of ship traffic flow. Ship Domain (SD) model [17][18] is one of the earliest 
and the most widely used model to estimate encounter rates. SD is defined as a water area 
around the own ship, where any violations of other ships are not allowed. The dimensions of a 
SD is influenced by many factors, including types of waters, navigation environment, a ship’s 
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size an so on. However, most SD models did not consider the manoeuvrability of encounter 
ships, especially in close-range encounter situations. In order to overcome this, Minimum 
Distance to Collision (MDTC) model [19][20] was proposed, which is defined as the 
minimum required distance between two ships to avoid collision with each other using the 
most effective actions (e.g. performing the largest turning angle with the correct turning 
directions). The MDTC model was comprehensively applied to the collision risk evaluation in 
the Gulf of Finland [19][21]. 
Ship traffic simulation is an effective tool to analyse both safety and efficiency of 
maritime transportation [22][23][24]. From traffic simulation perspective, Traffic conflict 
model [25] is another proactive collision risk approach for port areas, in which traffic conflict 
is defined as a situation that ship collision cannot be avoided if none of them perform 
effective actions. The degree of collision is measured according to the relative bearings, 
velocities between them. Such model has been applied to the Port of Singapore[26].  
According to the latest research on the encounter rate calculation model, there are 
various tools to obtain spatial and temporal distributions of different types of encounter 
situations (head-on, overtaking and crossing). Most of them can estimate the number of ships 
encounter according to the statistical characteristics of ship traffic flow from the macro 
dimension, providing a strong basis for collision risk assessment. 
2.2.2 Collision avoidance failure prediction 
Compared with the encounter rate prediction, the collision avoidance failure estimation 
is more complex because it is influenced by many factors such as human failures. One 
intuitive way is to calculate the ratio between the number of collision accidents to the total 
traffic volume in a specific period of time [27]–[29]. However, it can only present an overall 
picture on this issue, instead of providing with more detailed knowledge on the characteristics 
of failure mode. Fault tree or event tree analysis (FTA/ETA) [30][31] is widely applied to 
representing the logical relationship between different failures and the accident. For example, 
Uurlu et al.[30] identified and quantified the main causation factors of maritime accidents, 
including COLREGs violation, communication failure, interpretation failure of the officer on 
watch. Fuzzy Logic (FL) and Evident Reasoning (ER) [6] are usually used synthetically to 
express the correlation between factors and risks, as well as some decision making procedures 
in maritime emergency decision making, considering the uncertainties from the data, the 
model and so on. For example,  ER is applied to the rescue mission optimization for ships that 
are out of control [27]. The incompleteness of information from different involved 
organizations are expressed using belief structures. A case study was performed for an 
accident with main engine failure to validate the model. 
FTA/ETA and ER models are tree-structured model and cannot express the correlations 
among different factors. Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) [32] are another widely used tools 
in modelling maritime accidents. A comprehensive literature review is performed in [33], in 
which the authors highlighted its advantages in expressing complex, weak and uncertain 
relationships in maritime safety and risk assessment. However, it also has some challenges, 
especially in different types of uncertainties, as well as validation of the models. Despite this, 
BBN is a useful tool for safety management and decision making. Zhang et al.[34][35] 
proposed a relative risk model based on Conjugate Bayesian method. The relative risk model 
is applied to quantitative evaluation of critical factors of collision risk of Tianjin Port. The 
model can also identify and quantify key factors of collision accident causations by 
combining Bayes and least square method. The results indicate that navigational area, ship 
type and time of the day are among the main causations to the accidents in Tianjin Port.  
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The researches above are mainly investigating maritime risk from a static perspective. 
However, maritime accidents are usually characterized with dynamic events. For example, 
during a collision avoidance decision procedure, ships are performing actions iteratively and 
the collision risk varies a lot with uncertainties during the whole process. For example, Wang 
et al. [36] performed a spatial-temporal analysis on an accident under different scenarios. 
Chang & Mosleh [37] proposed dynamic probabilistic simulation of operating crew response 
to complex system accident called (IDS-IDACrew). The model can predict the process risk in 
a real-time mode by quantifying the distance of the present situation to the risk boundaries. 
This model is largely used in the nuclear sector and has potential to extend its application to 
maritime sectors. 
Based on the related research results, this paper takes collision accident in Qinzhou Port 
as a case study. A four stage collision decision failure framework, including perception, 
cognition, decision and action, is proposed. An ESD model is constructed to express collision 
avoidance decision-making phase. Then, based on historical data on collision accident in 
Qinzhou waters, combined with experts’ knowledge, failure rates under different encounter 
situations are estimated. Based on this, a quantitative evaluation of the reliability of the 
collision avoidance decision-making is performed and compared with related research results 
to verify the proposed method. 
3. Collision avoidance failure model 
3.1 ESD model for collision avoidance decision making 
When performing a collision avoidance action, the navigating ships usually follow 
similar procedures, no matter they are made by seafarers or by collision avoidance decision 
support systems. The first step is to identify dangerous targets nearby the own ship. The 
targets mainly include moving ships which are approaching, static obstacles such as reefs, 
buoys. An effective watch-keeping by the seafarers. If the seafarers failed in identifying the 
targets, some advanced onboard sensors can be treated as supplements in alarming the 
collision risk from the targets. The targets can be identified using on-board monitoring 
system, such as on-board Radar, Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA), Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), etc. However, such systems may fail in identifying obstacles, or 
make a false alarm under complex environment. If a target ship is not identified in either of 
the two ways, a collision accident is inevitable.  
After the targets have been identified and motion parameters are available with 
satisfactory precision, the next step is the collision avoidance decision making, in which a 
safe and effective collision-free path needs to be formulated for the ships. The decisions need 
to comply with the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea (COLREGs), in 
which the roles (give-way or stand-on) and requirements of the encounter ships are 
determined according to their relative location and bearings. The final step is to manoeuvre 
the ships to follow the planned path. The main risk in this step can be mechanical failure, 
wind, current and waves, and the manoeuvrability restrictions of the ships. 
Based on the above four-stage collision avoidance decision making framework, the 
ESD model can be constructed, which is shown in Fig. 2. It can be seen from the figure that 
the starting point is the encounter situation formed by the ships, which mainly includes three 
encounter situations: head-on, crossing and overtaking. It should be noted that the collision 
avoidance operations vary a lot for the three encounter situations. For the head-on situation, 
both two ships need to turn starboard and cross each other in a port-to-port mode. With 
respect to the crossing situation, the collision avoidance actions are largely dependent on the 
crossing angles between the two ships. It is more favourable to turn starboard for a large angle 
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crossing whereas reducing velocity is recommended for a small angle crossing case. In 
summary, the failure probabilities for different encounter situations will have certain degree 
of distinctions.  
According to Fig. 2, there are two possibilities for the final results, which are success 
and failure. The final events S1-S3 mean that a collision is avoided, while the final events F1-
F7 mean that a collision accident occurs. According to the ESD model, the failures of both 
watch-keeping and target detection will lead to occurrence of the collision accident. p1-p4 
represents the probabilities of failures at each stage, which need to be quantified in order to 




























































Fig. 2  Event sequence diagram of collision risk in Qinzhou Port 
3.2 Failure probability values 
Based on the above ESD model for collision risk prediction, it is necessary to estimate 
the failure probability at each stage, so as to analyse the overall collision risk level. The 
probabilities can be calculated using the historical data in Qinzhou Port. Table 2 present a 
sample of the historical accident. According to the collision accident data from 2013 to 2017 
as well as the overall traffic flow, the failure probabilities at each stage of decision making 
can be calculated, which is present in the first row of Table 3. It should be noted that the main 
causations of collision accidents are recorded in accident reports of Qinzhou Port. According 
to the report present in Table 2, the causations of each collision accident can be identified. 
Some accidents are caused by multiple causations. All the causations are counted as one of 
the failures shown in Fig. 2 and they are all counted in the failure probability calculations. It 
should be noted that the causation “Not command safe speed” and “Collision avoidance action 
conflict” are treated as action failure because they are more related with collision avoidance 
actions.  
In order to analyse the failure modes in more detail, the encounter situation is further 
classified into four categories, which are head-on, large angle crossing, small angle crossing 
and overtaking. With respect to the crossing situations, the situations with crossing angle 
larger than 90° is considered as large angle crossing, otherwise it is considered as small angle 
crossing. It is evident that the degree of difficulty for different encounter situations varies a lot 
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and they need be evaluated respectively. For instance, in a head-on situation, a very small 
course alteration will result in an apparent derivation from the present trajectory and keep 
clearance of the target ship. On the contrary, in a small-angle crossing situation, a small 
course alteration would not enough to change the direction of the relative velocity with target 
ships to avoid collision. A detailed graphical explanation on this can be seen in the research 
by Zhang et al.[40]. 
Table 2  A sample of the historical collision accident records (From Qinzhou MSA) 
Wind Causations Ship Type 
NW4-5 Negligence watch-keeping; Collision avoidance action conflict 
Sand Carrier 
Sand Carrier 
NW5-6 Collision avoidance action conflict; Decision failures 
Others 
Fishing Ship 
E2-3 Mis-operation; Decision failures 
Others 
Fishing Ship 
SE3-4 Collision avoidance action conflict; Not command good seamanship 
Sand Carrier 
Others 
SE4-5 Negligence watch-keeping; Not command safe speed; Decision failures 
Others 
Oil Cargo Ship 
SW5-6 Negligence watch-keeping; Not command safe speed 
Fishing Ship 
Others 
SE2-3 Negligence watch-keeping; Collision avoidance action conflict 
Container 
Fishing Ship 




However, the historical data did not record such detailed data and the failure rates are 
not directly available. Alternatively, the subjective knowledge of experts in Qinzhou 
Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) was introduced. In order to do this, we invited 10 
experts, including three managers in Qinzhou MSA, five captains of the ships navigating in 
the waters, and two safety and security officers from shipping companies. They are all males 
and they have 5-20 years of experience in maritime transportation risk management in the 
Qinzhou Port. They are all familiar with the navigation safety situation in the water area from 
a macro perspective. The experts in Qinzhou MSA are working in the VTS centre, who are 
familiar with the ship traffic behaviours. The captains are very familiar with the navigational 
environment in the port. The experts from shipping companies have advantage in safety 
culture and safety management practices and skills. They are required to estimate the failure 
possibilities in the four stages. Due to the fact that the probabilities are rather small values and 
it is difficult for them to estimate, the questionnaire survey simplified the problem by the 
following questions: What are the maximum and minimum number of failures in each stage 
of collision avoidance procedures in 10, 000 encounter situations? It should be noted that the 
failure probabilities may vary a lot under harsh and good navigation environment. For 
example, the probability of failure in identifying target ships by watch-keeping should be 
higher in poor visibility than in good visibility. Therefore, the experts are required to give an 
upper and lower bounds on the failure probabilities. Based on their subjective knowledge, the 
failure probabilities under different situations is present in lines 2-5 of Table 3. The left values 
in the brackets are the average of the minima whereas the right values are the maxima of the 
failure probabilities from the ten experts. 
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Table 3  Failure probability values under different situations 
Encounter 
situations 





4.77 E-5 1.91 E-5 1.05 E-4 1.43 E-4 
Head-on [4.37E-5, 7.04E-5] [5.05E-6, 6.23E-6] [2.19E-5, 4.87E-5] [6.51E-5, 9.26E-5] 
Large angles 
crossing 
[1.35E-5, 5.51E-5] [2.38E-5, 4.21E-5] [1.02E-4, 1.47E-4] [1.04E-4, 1.56E-4] 
Small angles 
crossing 
[1.24E-4, 3.07E-4] [1.04E-5, 1.77E-5] [4.69E-4, 7.14E-4] [5.07E-4, 7.30E-4] 
overtaking [5.63E-6, 8.71E-6] [7.43E-6, 8.25E-6] [5.04E-5, 8.26E-5] [8.47E-5, 1.22E-4] 
4. Results and analysis 
According to the four-stage ESD model for collision avoidance decision making, the 
occurrence probabilities of different failure modes can be calculated using the following 
formula: 
1 2 3 4
1 2 3
1 2 3 4
1 2 3
1 2 3 4
1 2 3
1 2
1=(1- )(1- )(1- )
2=(1- )(1- )
3=(1- ) (1- )
4=(1- )
5= (1- )(1- )
6= (1- )
7=
F p p p p
F p p p
F p p p p
F p p p
F p p p p
F p p p
F p p
                                                                                   （2） 
Where F1 means action failure, F2 means decision failure, F3 means action failure with 
RADAR/ARPA detection failure, F4 means decision failure with RADAR/ARPA detection 
failure, F5 means action failure with watch-keeping failure, F6 means decision failure with 
watch-keeping failure, and F7 means target detection failure. Based on the above formula and 
the probability distribution in the first row of Table 3, the average probability distribution of 
different failure modes in Qinzhou Port is calculated, which is present in Fig. 3. As can be 
seen from the figure, F1 and F2 is much higher than other failure modes and they are about 4 
orders of magnitude higher. Therefore, it can be concluded that the main causations of ship 
collision mainly include the failure of collision avoidance decision and action failure. It is 
found from the accident report that such two failure modes are mainly caused by improper 
ship handling, conflicts between different collision avoidance actions and unfamiliar with the 
navigation environment. Therefore, it can be concluded that these human errors are the main 
causes of collision accidents in Qinzhou Port. 
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Fig. 3  Probability distribution of different failure modes 
Fig. 4 shows the probability distributions of failure modes under different encounter 
situations. The upper and lower limits of each probability distribution are marked in the 
figure, correspondingly. As can be seen from the figure, F1 and F2 are also the main failure 
modes of collision accidents, which are in general higher than other failure modes by 4-5 
orders of magnitude. When comparing the four subfigures, the probabilities of collision 
avoidance failure in small-angle crossing situation is the highest, which is one order of 
magnitude higher than other scenarios. Such result is in general in agreement with our 
intuitions. When ships are encountering each other with small crossing angle, it becomes 
more difficult to identify the target ships because they are navigating in very close direction, 
where the watch-keepers usually pay less attention to. Moreover, the collision avoidance for 
such situations is also very complex. It is not clear in such cases whether to avoid collision by 
course alteration, speed change, or by using both. And it usually takes a long time to keep 
clearance to each other. Due to the above reasons, the failure probabilities tend to be higher 
than other encounter scenarios. 
It can also be seen from the figures that the probabilities of failures in overtaking are the 
lowest among the four encounter situations, but with the largest degree of uncertainty. The 
main reason may be that the front targets are more easily to be identified and collision 
avoidance decisions are clear under such situations. Both ships should turn to starboard and 
traverse each other in a port-to-port mode. One issue that needs to be considered is that the 
head-on situation may be confused with large crossing angles. If so, only one of the ships may 
take actions, rather than both of them. This may be the reasons for large uncertainty of the 
results. As a result, the performance of communication and coordination between them 
become one of the most important factors for collision avoidance. 
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Fig. 4  Probability distribution of failure modes under different encounter situations 
Table 4  Comparisons of collision avoidance failure probabilities in different water areas 
Navigation waters Encounter situations Prob. of collision avoidance failures 
Common waters ([10][38]) 
Crossing [8.48 E-5, 5.80 E-4] 
Head-on [2.7 E-5, 5.18 E-4] 
The gulf of Finland ([33][39]) 
Crossing [5.1 E-4, 6.0 E-4] 
Head-on [5.1 E-4, 6.0 E-4] 
Qinzhou Port waters (This paper) 
Overtaking [8.97 E-5, 2.05 E-4] 
Large angle crossing [2.06 E-4, 3.03 E-4] 
Small angle crossing [9.76 E-4, 1.4 E-3] 
Head-on [8.7 E-5, 1.41 E-4] 
In order to further analyse the validity of the calculated results and make a crosswise 
comparison with the failure rates in other similar water areas, Table 4 lists the results from 
some other existing researches, including the common waters, the Gulf of Finland, as well as 
the Qinzhou Port calculated in this study. As can be seen from the data, the current research is 
limited to cross encounter and opposite encounter, which is generally within the range of 10-
4-10-5. The calculated results in this paper are relatively consistent with the results of these 
studies. However, the probability of collision avoidance failure is higher under the condition 
of small Angle cross encounter in Qinzhou Port waters, which is on the order of 10-3. 
Therefore, it is necessary to focus on how to reduce the reliability of collision avoidance 
decision in such encounter situations. In general, the probability of collision avoidance 
failures is relatively low compared with other waters. 
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The paper presents a general picture of collision risk in Qinzhou Port using quantitative 
analysis of the proposed ESD model. The results indicate that the failure rates of collisions in 
Qinzhou Port are in general similar with other types of navigable waters, but with certain 
degree of variations for different encounter situations. The accident rates under small crossing 
encounter situations are much higher than others. Recalling the expert data in Table 3, it can 
be seen that the failure rates of p2 and p4 are much higher for small crossing situations. This 
indicates that collision risk is largely derived from the failures in the process of watch-
keeping and ship handling. As a result, special attention needs to be paid to enhancing the 
seafarers’ attention to the targets in lateral direction, especially small targets like fishing 
vessel and tug boats. The ships’ officers are encouraged to continuously re-examine the 
performance of the action they have made in reducing collision. They should also keep 
effective communication with the target ships, so that they can make adjustment in time when 
the actions are ineffective. 
The results from expert knowledge carry certain degree of uncertainty. This is mainly 
derived from the inconsistence among different experts, which seems to be a common 
phenomenon in subjective risk analysis. One possible way to deal with such issue is to get 
more historical accident data with more detailed information. By doing this, a more 
comprehensive statistical analysis would become possible. From this point of view, it is 
meaningful to formulate a detailed report for each accident.  
It should be noted that the proposed ESD model is a static mode. However, the collision 
avoidance procedure is usually in a dynamic mode. When a ship officer is making a decision 
and performs actions, he will keep monitoring the situation and made new decisions based on 
new information. By doing so, the procedure is performed in an iterative way. From this point 
of view, the proposed model can be extended into a dynamic ESD model in the future 
research. In order to realize this, the collision risk need to be modelled in a real-time mode. 
And a probabilistic model for quantifying the effectiveness of collision avoidance actions 
should also be proposed.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, based on a four-stage decision making model, an ESD model for collision 
avoidance decision-making for Qinzhou Port was constructed. According to historical data 
and expert knowledge, the occurrence probabilities of different failure modes under different 
encounter situations are calculated. The results indicate that collision avoidance decision 
failures and action failures are two main causations leading to collision. The main factors 
leading to these failure modes include improper ship handling, action conflict, and unfamiliar 
with the navigation environment. Compared with related researches in other waters, the 
failure probability of collision avoidance decision in small angle crossing situations in 
Qinzhou Port is at a relatively higher level, while it is at a lower level in the situation of 
crossing encounters. These findings can provide with good reference for developing effective 
collision risk management strategies in the Qinzhou Port waters. 
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